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Similar to most top-tier matches in professional basketball, baseball and soccer, high-
level competitions in individualistic sports, such as the tennis tournaments of Wimble-
don and Flushing Meadows, the golf tournaments of Augusta and St. Andrews, as well 
as the marathons of New York and London attract not only thousands of spectators, but 
also a TV audience of millions of fans. Moreover, these (and other) individualistic 
sports have recently received increased attention also from economists trying to test a 
number of hypotheses that can be derived from “tournament theory” or – as a synonym 
– from “contest theory”. 
 
The chapter is structured as follows: We first provide a brief description of the devel-
opment of prize money levels and structures in the three different individual sports men-
tioned in the previous paragraph (and, consequently, athletes’ incomes over the last 
years section 2). We then summarize the basic insights and the core predictions of tour-
nament/contest theory (section 3) and review the available literature on the incentive 
effects of tournament pay systems in athletic contests (section 4).  Finally, section 5 
concludes and raises some of the questions that have not been answered yet and that 
should, therefore, be dealt with in future research. 
 
 
2. The Development of Prize Money Levels and Structures 
 
The top events in tennis, golf and – to a much lesser extent – in distance running offer 
considerable purses to the successful contestants. Moreover, all three sports are organ-
ized like a pyramid with different series of tournaments not only for the top athletes, but 
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  1also for less talented/less successful players as well as for developing talent.  
 
The ATP (Association of Tennis Professionals) tour calendar for 2007 includes 63 dif-
ferent tournaments that vary considerably in the prize purses they offer, ranging from 
332.000$ to 3.7 Mio. $
3. Nine of these tournaments belong to the “Masters Series”, of-
fering between 2.5 and 3.2 Mio. $ each. This series is crowned by the “Masters Cup”, to 
which the eight highest ranked players in the preceding year are invited. The prize purse 
of this tournament currently stands at 3.7 Mio. $. The remaining 53 tournaments belong 
to the “International Series” with nine of them having “Gold” status due to the higher 
prize money they offer (more than 1.0 Mio. $). The most prestigious tournaments, how-
ever, are the four “Grand Slam” events (Melbourne, London, Paris, New York) that are 
organized by the ITF (International Tennis Federation). In 2007, the total prize purses 
offered by these four tournaments vary between 15 and 23 Mio. $.  
 
Figure 1 
Prize Money Levels and Structures in the “Grand Slam” Tennis Tournaments, 2007 









red: Wimbledon; green: Paris; blue: Flushing Meadows; yellow: Melbourne 
 
In these latter tournaments, the winners of the two singles competitions, for example, 
receive between 800,000 and 1 Mio. $ while the runner-up is paid approximately 50% 
of that amount (see Figure 1). In the tournaments offering lower purses, the distribution 
                                                 
3   Depending on the size of the prize purse these tournaments admit either 32 or 64 players (sometimes 
players have to compete successfully in an elimination round to be admitted). Only the Grand Slam 
tournaments start with a field of 128 players.  
  2of the prize money is slightly different, with the winner receiving a larger “share of the 
pie”. Players failing to qualify for the ATP events can in 2007 participate in either one 
of the 174 different “challenger tournaments” that offer considerably lower prize purses 
(ranging from 25,000 to 125,000 $), trying to accumulate the ranking points that are 
required to get admission to the (better paying and more prestigious) ATP tournaments. 
Moreover, nearly 4,200 different “futures tournaments” are played all over the world, 
offering purses that vary between 10,000 and 15,000 $. 
 
In professional golf, the total prize purse in the most prestigious competition, the PGA 
Tour, reached 295 Mio. $ in 2007. The purse per tournament (there are about fifty of 
them) varies between 3.5 and 9.0 Mio. $ with the percentage breakdown being identical 
regardless of the total purse. The winner of a tournament always receives 18.0% of the 
total purse, the runner-up is awarded 10.8% and the player finishing third receives 6.8% 
(see Figure 2)
4. Thus, as in the case of tennis, we observe a highly nonlinear distribution 
of rewards to performance with the top performers receiving disproportionately large 
shares of the money that is at stake. 
 
Figure 2 













Again, as in the case of tennis, a “super tournament” to which the most successful play-
                                                 
4   A virtually identical structure exists, for example, in Europe with the European PGA, the “Seniors 
Tour” and the “Challenge Tour”. On average, these tours offer considerably smaller purses than their 
US counterparts: In 2007, the purses vary between 0.5 and 6.2 Mio. € (European PGA), 0.19 and 1.5 
Mio. € (European Seniors) and 0.12 and 0.605 Mio. € (Challenge Tour). 
  3ers are invited at the end of the season (Tour Championship), links the different contests 
together. Moreover, there are two minor professional tours in the US, the “Champions 
Tour” for players aged 50 and more
5 and the “Nationwide Tour” for younger and/or less 
successful players trying to qualify for the PGA Tour. Both tours consist of slightly 
more than 30 tournaments offering prize purses that vary between 1.6 and 2.6 Mio. $ 
(Champions Tour) and 0.450 and 0.775 Mio. $ (Nationwide Tour). Here again, the dis-
tribution of the purse is identical across all tournaments. 
  
A quite different picture emerges if we look at the purses of the five city marathons 
forming the “World Marathon Majors” (the races in Berlin, Boston, Chicago, London, 
and New York)
6. Contrary to the top-tier tournaments in tennis and golf where entry is 
restricted to athletes who have qualified for the respective event (more on that below), 
participation in either of these races - as well as in other city marathons - is open. The 
five events, along with the Olympic Marathon and the IAAF World Championships 
Marathon, serve as the qualifying races in the series. At the conclusion of each qualify-
ing race, the top five male and female finishers are awarded points based on their finish 
place. At the conclusion of each two-year series, a $1 million prize purse will be split 
equally between the top male and female point earners, providing each champion with 
$500,000. The total score for each athlete in a series will consist of points earned from a 
maximum of four qualifying races during that two-year cycle. Athletes earn points by 
placing among the top five in qualifying races. Points are allocated following each race 
as follows: First place results in twenty-five points, second place in fifteen points, third 
place in ten points, fourth place in five points and fifth place in one point. Points from a 
maximum of four qualifying races will be scored. If an athlete earns points in more than 
four events, the athlete’s best four finishes will be scored.  
 
It appears from Figure 3 that the winner usually receives twice the amount that goes to 
the runner-up, while the second placed finisher receives about 30% more than the per-
                                                 
5   A large fraction of the players on this tour have been active on the PGA’s main tour already and con-
tinue to play after they became eligible for the Champions Tour. However, many of the seniors have 
never played as professionals when they were younger. 
6   According to “Spiridon” – the most popular running magazine in the German speaking world – there 
are at least 1,000 city marathons in the world (most of them either in Europe or in the United States). 
While some of them draw up to 35,000 runners, others have less than 100 finishers.  
  4son finishing in third place. Contrary to tennis and golf tournaments, the number of ath-
letes who receive a share of the pie varies considerably. In Chicago, only the top 5 fin-
ishers are getting paid while in Boston the top 15 are rewarded (the remaining three 
races are somewhere in the middle between these two extremes). 
 
Figure 3 
Prize Money Levels in the World Marathon Majors, 2006-2007 
 










red: New York; green: Chicago; blue: Boston; yellow: London; pink: Berlin 
 
Moreover, in the case of distance running events, the prize purse is usually considerably 
extended by performance-related bonuses. If athletes break certain barriers (such as 2 
hours and 10 minutes (men) or 2 hours and 30 minutes (women)) or run a new course or 
even a world record, they can considerably increase their revenues (Table 1).  
 
Table 1 




Berlin Boston  Chicago  London  New  York 
Sub 2:10:00  2,500*  -  7,500  3,000  25,000 
Sub 2:08:30  7,500  -  15,000  15.000  40,000 
Sub  2:07:30  15,000 - 30,000  25.000**  70,000 
Sub  2:06:30  30,000 - 55,000 -  - 
Course record  n.d.  25,000  200,000  25,000  60,000 
World record  n.d.  50,000  300,000  125,000  n.d. 
  
*   required time: 2:09:30 
** required time: 2:08:00 
- no bonus available; n.d. bonus not disclosed 
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Obviously, the bonus payments are not correlated with the prize purse or the amount of 
money that can be earned by the winner, but are related to the difficulty of the course. 
The men’s current as well as the previous world record have been set in Berlin, suggest-
ing that Berlin is the fastest of the five courses. New York, on the other hand, is clearly 
the most difficult one. 
 
Table 2 
Top Earners in Selected Individual Sports 
 
Sport / Gender 
2006 Earnings*  Career Earnings 




Name Amount  Name Amount 
1  Berhane Adere  237,500  Paula Radcliffe  1,842,835 
10  Meseret Defar  126,000  Susan Chepkemei  768,095 
50  Nataliya Volguina  29,165  Nuta Olaru  292,175 
Road Running / Men** 
1  Robert Cheruiyot  266,000  Haile Gebrselassie  2,343,883 
10  Daniel Njenga  80,000  Moses Tanui  553,395 
50 Evans  Cheruiyot  29,820 Sammy  Korir  275,070 
Tennis / Women*** 
1  Justine Henin  4,204,810  Steffi Graf  21,895,277 
10  Patty Schnyder  883,685  Kim Clijsters  14,764,295 
50  Iveta Benesova  251,563  Nathalie Dechy  3,514,709 
Tennis /Men*** 
1  Roger Federer  8,343,835  Pete Sampras  43,280,489 
10  Jonas Bjorkman  1,221,485  Lleyton Hewitt  17,215,012 
50  Nicolas Kiefer  456,005  Thomas Johansson  6,535,842 
Golf / Women*** 
1  Lorena Ochoa  2,592,872  Annika Sorenstam  20,641,936 
10  Pat Hurst  1,128,662  Christie Kerr  7,752,263 
50  Nancy Scranton  274,304  Janice Moodie  3,066,135 
Golf / Men*** 
1  Tiger Woods  9,941,563  Tiger Woods  65,712,324 
10  Brett Wetterich  3,023,185  Kenny Perry  20,335,031 
50  Richard S. Johnson  1,555,376  Shigeki Maruyama  12,241,561 
 
*  Annual earnings in nominal US $. 
**  Complete through August 2007. 
***  Complete through December 2006. 
 
Sources: www.rrm.com, www.pgatour.com ,www.lpga.com. www.tennisessentials.com, 
               www.tennis.bravehost.com, www.nascar.com
 
  6These differences in total prize purses and prize distributions translate into different 
annual and lifetime earnings of the respective groups of athletes. Table 2 reveals that the 
annual as well as the career earnings of golf and tennis players are about 20 times higher 
than the ones of long distance runners who, in general, earn more than most other track 
and field athletes (with the notable exception of sprinters
7). This finding holds irrespec-
tive of whether one looks at number one, number ten or number fifty of the respective 
earnings list. 
 
It is, of course,  quite likely that the figures presented in Table 2 underestimate the earn-
ings of the distance runners because their “incomes … are generally a mysterious mix of 
shoe-contract money and appearance fees, which for the top performers can total far 
more than $ 1 million a year. Yet in a marketplace in which celebrity is often measured 
by salary, these invisible niches have no promotional value” (Layden 1998)
8. However, 
since the endorsement contracts signed by the top golf and tennis players (remember the 
multi-million and multi-year contracts of Tiger Woods and the Williams sisters with 
Nike) are generally much higher than the ones granted to distance runners, the figures 
presented above grossly underestimate the earnings differentials between the three 
groups of individual athletes. 
 
 
3. Athletic Contests as Rank-Order Tournaments 
 
Athletic contests, such as golf tournaments and long-distance foot races, are invariably 
rank ordered because most of the social interest and value of these events lies in ascer-
taining the “best” contestant. The contests themselves represent a test of abilities and 
motivations among the individual participants; the common and binding “rules of the 
game” allow relative evaluations. Athletes entering a particular contest choose their 
                                                 
7   „Track and field pays a lot more for sprinters than it does for top distance runners. That’s not the in-
justice, though. If the top distance runners start griping about money, … the women’s throwers would 
consider killing them and burying them in shallow graves near minor European villages. And if the 
women’s throwers start griping … the racewalkers would have a legitimate grudge” (Hollobaugh 
2003). 
8   According to various press reports, sprinter Carl Lewis was able to command an appearance fee of $ 
100,000 in the mid 1980s already. The average athlete, however, will be happy already if the organiz-
ers pay his/her travel costs. Tyson Gay, the current 100 and 200m World Champion, receives 50,000 $ 
in appearance fees for his starts after he won three titles in Osaka in August 2007. 
  7effort levels and other actions (such as their strategies) to optimize against the efforts of 
opponents, given the rules of the game and the costs and rewards of winning
9. 
 
From an economic point of view, the structure of athletic contests can be described as 
follows: First, prizes are fixed in advance and are – with the exception of performance-
related bonuses in marathon races – independent of absolute performance. This means 
that the winner receives the first prize not for being good, but for being (slightly) better 
than the runner-up. The amount of money that goes to the winner is not affected by the 
amount by which he beats the runner-up. Even if both athletes do extremely well neither 
the total prize money nor its distribution will be affected. Second, the level of effort 
with which each athlete tries to win the contest he has entered depends on the size of the 
(potential) prize. This implies that the larger the spread between the winner’s and the 
loser’s prize, the higher the effort exerted by both athletes. Thus, prize structures are 
designed to induce individual contestants to put forth more effort which, in turn, in-
creases the interest of sports fans in that competition (with the likely consequence that 
the profits of the organizer increase, too). This does not mean, however, that contest 
organizers should implement a winner-take-all tournament, because there clearly is a 
limit to spread. Although additional spread induces more effort, the average prize mon-
ey must be high enough to attract athletes to enter the event in the first place. 
 
Athletes typically receive feedback during the competition about their relative positions. 
Since final payoffs usually depend only on rank order and not on absolute performance, 
contestants will adjust their behavior in response to that intermediate information: A 
golf player who on the last day of a tournament knows that he is ten strokes behind he 
leader has less incentives to put forth effort that a player who is just one stroke behind. 
Similarly, a marathon runner who is informed by his coach that at km 30 he is two min-
utes behind the leader is less likely to speed up than a runner who is just 20 seconds 
behind. Moreover, if athletes can choose between “risky” and “safe” strategies, they are 
                                                 
9   The following sections draw heavily from Rosen (1988) and Lazear (1998: 223-257). For a more 
formal discussion of the concept see, inter alia, Alchian (1988), Bognanno (2001), Clark and Riis 
(1996), Cooper, Graham and Dyke (1993), Dye (1984), Green and Stokey (1983), Konrad (2007), La-
zear and Rosen (1981), McLaughlin (1988), Moldovanu and Sela (2001, 2006), Nalebuff and Stiglitz 
(1983), O’Keefe, Viscusi and Zeckhauser (1984), and Rosen (1986). Szymanski (2003) provides a re-
view of contest theory with particular reference to team sports. 
  8likely to alter their choice of strategy in response to intermediate information, i.e. a ten-
nis player who is three points behind in the final set of a match is likely to play with 
more risk by, for example, serving harder. Thus, in a tournament the leader has an in-
centive to pursue a “safe” strategy while the trailer usually pursues a “risky” strategy 
(see Hvide 2002, Hvide and Kristiansen 2003, Kräkel and Sliwka 2004). 
 
Apart from the “incentive function” described above, athletic contests also serve a “sort-
ing function”. By having a pyramidal structure of events it is possible to let individuals 
compete with one another and then have winners compete with other winners to get 
admission to the top-tier tournaments where higher prize purses are at stake. In the end, 
such a structure is equivalent to a multiple-round elimination tournament. Both systems 
try to ensure that only the most able competitors make it to the final round or the final 
contest
10. Summarizing, the function of minor tournaments is not only to identify par-
ticularly able athletes, but also to avoid “contamination” of the professional elite. This is 
important insofar as, for example, the prize money that is being paid to a first-round 
loser in a Grand Slam tournament often exceeds the amount of money he can earn in a 
minor tournament. Moreover, as the number of contestants increases, the individual’s 
probability of winning decreases. Since with too many participants contestants are dis-
couraged to put forth effort, free and open entry is generally not the optimal participa-
tion policy. 
 
Thus, organizers of top events usually try to limit the number of entries. In tennis, for 
example, 96 of the 128 spots at a Grand Slam tournament are filled according to the 
actual world ranking with the remaining 32 slots being filled by players who have to 
qualify immediately before the tournament in a particular “elimination round”. In golf, 
entry to most PGA tournaments is limited to 144 or 156 players with a few tournaments 
restricting entry much more severely. Again, the rationing device is a player’s past per-
formance. The highest priority category consist of golfers who have either won a tour-
nament in the recent past or who finished among the top 125 money winners in the pre-
vious years. The middle category consists of players who were among the top 15 money 
                                                 
10   Fullerton and McAfee (1999) discuss a „contest selection auction“ as a potential device to prevent 
adverse selection of less able participants into a tournament offering high prize money. 
  9winners on the PGA’s minor league golf tour or finished among the top 35 at the annual 
PGA qualifying tournament before the start of the season. The lowest priority category 
consists of players who do not qualify for either one of the first two groups. While golf-
ers in the first category have guaranteed slots in any tournament they wish to enter, 
players from the second category are occasionally denied access by the rationing rule. 
Finally, players from the third category are most of the time not admitted to a tourna-
ment they wish to enter
11. In distance running access to a particular race is usually not 
restricted by eligibility or performance, but by the local organizer’s willingness to pay 
for an athlete’s travel costs and accommodation. Since the organizers of the more re-
nowned races have an incentive to assemble the best athletes, recent top performers 
have a much higher probability of being invited, i.e. the selection procedure is in the 
end quite similar to the one described above for golf and tennis.   
 
Effort usually suffers when heterogeneous athletes compete against each other
12. Effort 
has the largest effect on changing the probability of winning when the contestants are of 
similar ability. If ability differs among contestants, then both the talented and the less 
talented ones tend to slack off. To maintain high levels of effort it is important to group 
athletes so that they are evenly matched with those against which the will directly com-
pete. Another possibility is to implement “handicap rules” that compensate the weaker 
athletes’ disadvantage or to offer additional rewards to the weaker athletes
13. Thus, het-
erogeneity is another reason not to implement a winner-take-all prize money structure: 
In order to motivate weaker athletes to put forth effort, prizes for the runner-up, the 
third finisher, etc. are clearly warranted (see Szymanski and Valletti 2005)
14. 
                                                 
11  For a further description of the structure of the “professional golf circus” see, inter alia, Cottle (1990) 
and Shmanske (2004: 193-210). 
12  In this situation, the “underdog” may wish to sabotage the other contestants instead of putting forth 
more effort. In order to avoid such behaviour, contestants have to be monitored (see Kräkel 2005). 
13  If it is difficult to determine the athletes’ ability levels, it is advisable to repeat the competition. Take 
as an example a golf tournament where the contestants have to complete 18 holes a day over a period 
of four days. Under these circumstances it is very unlikely that a lucky (instead of an able) athlete 
wins (see Gürtler 2006). 
14  In some individualistic sports, such as gymnastics, figure skating and ski jumping, the athletes ranking 
at the end of the competition is not only determined by their “objective” performance”, but also by the 
“subjective impression” of (impartial?) judges (Zitzewitz (2006) documents a “nationalistic bias” in 
the evaluations of judges in figure skating). This introduces an element of luck (or “noise”) into the 
competition which, in turn, leads to a lower level of effort. The reason is that noise reduces the value 
of effort by reducing the probability of winning. When luck is important it is, therefore, important to 
offset the decline in effort by using a larger prize spread.  
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The asymmetric prize structure in a single athletic contest is very often supplemented by 
a “super contest” that links together the single events. The “option value” of competing 
in that latter contest provides additional motivation to athletes to perform well in the 
individual tournaments they enter over the course of a season. When the athlete reaches 
the final round, there is no longer any option value, i.e. winning the “super contest” is 
the end of the story. Therefore, the prize money in that final contest is usually particu-
larly high. The three individualistic sports that are of particular interest in this chapter 
have all introduced such a super contest – the “Tour Championship” in golf, the “Mas-
ters Cup” in tennis and the “World Marathon Majors” in distance running,. 
 
The research agenda discussed in the previous section can be summarized under three 
different headings: First, the impact of prizes and prize spreads on incentives to per-
form, second, the impact of the structure of the contest on the individual athlete’s stra-
tegic behavior and, third, the different responses of “risk-loving” and “risk-averse” ath-
letes to tournament incentive systems. 
 
 
4.  Tournament Incentives and Athletic Performance: A Review of the Evidence 
 
In an extensive survey of labor markets in professional (team) sports, Kahn (2000: 89) 
concluded that “some of the most intriguing evidence on the links from incentives to 
performance comes from sports … like golf and marathon running”. In these sports it is 
possible to collect data on individual performance and to relate that data to the prize 
money offered in individual tournaments. 
 




Ehrenberg and Bognanno (1990a, 1990b) were the first to analyze the prize money-per-
formance relationship examining the scores in American and European PGA golf tour-
  11naments. Their first important finding is that scores are lower (indicating that perform-
ance is better) when the prize purse is higher. Second, they looked at the impact of a 
player’s position after the third day on his performance on the last day of the tourna-
ment. The expectation here is that players who are trailing one or more of their oppo-
nents very closely have a larger incentive to perform well as the marginal returns to 
effort are higher. This expectation is again strongly supported by the data. Finally, since 
the prize spread decreases with rank (the differences between to adjacent ranks are get-
ting smaller; see Figure 2 above) effort is expected to be higher (and scores lower) in 
the final round when a player has a better placing at the beginning of this round. Again, 
the expectation is strongly confirmed by the data
15. Focusing on the sorting effects of 
tournaments, Ehrenberg and Bognanno (1990a, 1990b) also show that exempt players 
(i.e. those who are allowed to enter any tournament they wish to play) are more likely 
than non-exempt players to enter tournaments that offer particularly high prize money
16. 
This latter finding is extended to yet another aspect: In a recent study Rhoads (2007) 
who finds that players’ annual entry decisions change as their exemption status changes: 
Players enjoying a lengthy exemption status enter significantly fewer events per year 
compared to players whose exemption status is about to expire
17. McFall, Knoeber and 
Thurman (2006) examine the incentive effects of a “grand prize” by comparing player 
performance on the PGA tour before and after the introduction of the season-ending 
“Tour Championship”. They find considerable changes particularly in the behavior of 
the most successful players: Since entry into the final tournament is restricted to those 
30 players who win the most money during the regular season, players who win early in 
the year face incentives to try harder and perform better than they otherwise would (and 
the reverse for those who lose early). Towards the end of the season, when those who 
have won early are assured of a spot in the finals, they will try less hard compared to 
                                                 
15  Using data from the season 1992, Orszag (1994) was unable to replicate these findings. He attributes 
this unexpected result to increased media coverage since the 1980s which might have led to increased 
nervousness among players, thus distorting the relationship between effort and performance. Using 
data from the 2000 Ladies PGA tour, Matthews, Sommers and Peschiera (2007) find that a higher 
prize purse has a negative impact on players’ performance, i.e. it increases (instead of decreases) the 
number of strokes required to complete the course. 
16   Using longitudinal data covering five consecutive seasons (1996-2000) with 12,700 player-
tournament-observations Bronars and Oettinger (2001) confirm this result. 
17  In another recent paper, Hood (2006) shows that on the PGA tour an increase in the participation of 
top players leads to a significant increase in the prize purse in the following year and that a change in 
the purse has again a positive impact on the entry decisions of the top players. 




Using data from the semi-finals and the finals of men’s and women’s major tennis tour-
naments played in the years 1990-2002 and 2002-2004, respectively, Sunde (2003) and 
Lallemand, Plasman and Rycx (2005) try to separate the incentive effects of prize mon-
ey from the impact of ex ante heterogeneity in players abilities. Both studies find that 
the incentive effect on effort resulting from playing a final, where the prize to be won is 
about twice as high as the prize for winning the semi-final, is positive and statistically 
highly significant. Thus, women and men seem to react to prize incentives in a very si-
milar way. The remaining results for men and women, however, are completely differ-
ent: While for women uneven contests lead favorites to win more games and underdogs 
to perform poorer, the exact opposite seems to be true for men. These results, although 
incompatible at first sight, can easily be reconciled: If the difference in the number of 
games won by the favorite and the underdog increases with the difference in the indi-
vidual players’ ranking position, it is the “capability aspect” of heterogeneity that domi-
nates. If, on the other hand, the difference in the number of games won by the favorite 
and the underdog decreases as the difference in the ranking positions increases, the “in-
centive aspect” of heterogeneity seems to dominate. Surprising as they may be, do these 
results certainly not suggest that men and women behave differently in a highly com-
petitive environment (more on that below). A plausible interpretation is that the hetero-
geneity measures used in the two studies – the absolute difference in the ranking points 
of the contestants – more accurately reflects heterogeneity in the abilities of women 
than in those of men. Coate and Robbins (2001) analyze the long-run effect of prize 
money on player careers by looking, first, at the number of tournaments played per year 
and, second, the timing of retirement. They use a sample of some 240 male and 220 
female tennis players who attained a singles ranking in the top 50 at least once on their 
respective tours between 1979 and 1994 and find that a $50,000 reduction in real tour-
nament earnings increases the probability of retiring in the following year by 15%. 
Moreover, the higher the prize money a player has one in the previous season, the more 
tournaments she is entering in the current season. Obviously, both findings are in line 





Maloney and McCormick (2000) use data from 115 foot races ranging in distance from 
one mile to full marathon that were held in the southeastern United States between 1987 
and 1991. They find that both the average prize paid and the prize spread have the pre-
dicted negative and statistically significant influence on finish times: Doubling the aver-
age prize leads to a fall in average times by about 2% and doubling the prize spread 
leads to a fall in average times by about 4%. They interpret their findings to be consis-
tent with the “sorting hypothesis” as well as the “incentive hypothesis”. Using data from 
135 different races ranging in distance from 5k to full marathon Lynch and Zax (2000) 
also confirm the hypothesis that times are faster in races offering higher prize money. 
However, when controlling for runner ability by including a measure of the athletes’ 
recent race history in the regression, the incentive effects of the prize level and spread 
completely disappear. The authors therefore attribute the impact of prize spread to the 
sorting effects of tournaments rather than the incentive effects. Frick (1998) and Frick 
and Klaeren (1997) use data from 57 different city marathons run worldwide between 
1983 and 1995 and involving much larger prize money (around 135,000 $ per race in 
1993 dollars). They find that (a) doubling the average prize reduces average times by 
one percent; (b) doubling the spread improves average times by two percent; (c) dou-
bling bonus payments improves average finish times by about .75 percent. Moreover, an 
increase in prize fund, spread and bonus payments also increases the closeness of the 
race (measured as the time difference between the winner the next four finishers). Fi-
nally, race times are decreasing in the number of “in the money” ranks (i.e. the number 
of prizes). Thus, all the characteristics of the prize fund seem to influence the elite run-
ners’ performance in the way predicted by tournament theory. However, when control-
ling for the endogeneity of the prize purse as well as for runner abilities, it turns out that 
the prize purse becomes insignificant while the spread variables retain their statistical 
significance (Frick and Prinz 2007). This seems to suggest that the selection effect of 
                                                 
18  Garin and von Allmen (2005) show that in Grand Slam tournaments an increase in the prize purse bet-
ween two rounds induces players to put forth considerably more effort in the sense of hitting more 
aces and more “winners”, i.e. shots that cannot be returned by the opponent. 




Fernie and Metcalf (1999) analyze the influence of alternative remuneration systems on 
the performance of a sample of British jockeys. They find that replacing incentive con-
tracts by non-contingent retainer payments introduces moral hazard into a payment sys-
tem which had proved to be very successful at overcoming such behavior: Jockeys who 
signed contracts that guaranteed them a fixed instead of a variable income showed a 
dramatically deteriorating performance. Not surprisingly, therefore, none of these con-
tracts was renewed – with the interesting consequence that most of the jockeys returned 
to their previous performance levels once they were paid strictly according to their re-
sults again. Moreover, analyzing data from Arabian horse races in the U.S. and Canada, 
Lynch (2005) finds that jockeys increase their efforts (lower their times) in the second 
half of races when the amount of prize money lost by dropping one place is greater and 
when there is less distance between them and their closest competitor
19. Finally, Lynch 
and Zax (1998) demonstrate that races with the highest prize purses attract contestants 
of varying ability. This “contamination effect” can be eliminated by increasing the prize 
spread which, in turn, will induce contestants to self-select into tournaments based on 
their individual abilities. 
 
Other Individualistic Sports 
 
Apart from foot and horse races as well as golf and tennis tournaments, a number of 
other individualistic sports have produced empirical studies on the prize money-perfor-
mance relationship, too: 
 
•  Using a three-year panel from the US Professional Bowlers Association Bognanno 
(1990) finds a consistently positive and generally significant influence of total prize 
                                                 
19  Boyle, Guthrie and Gorton (2006) demonstrate that client-owned horses perform significantly better 
than the horses that are owned by their trainers. Trainers have an incentive to devote more effort to 
horses they own themselves, but in doing so they run the risk that horses owned by clients will be 
transferred to other stables in the future. Thus, reputational incentives seem to be very important in 
this context.  
  15money on bowlers’ performance (as measured by the number of pins per round). 
This supports the main prediction of tournament theory that higher prize levels and, 
hence, dispersion among prizes lead to higher output. However, he also finds that the 
percentage of prize money allocated to first place has a significantly negative influ-
ence, suggesting that greater skewness reduces the rewards to winning – a finding 
that presents a contradiction to the theory under test. 
 
•  Becker and Huselid (1992) draw on two different panels from auto racing (NASCAR 
and IMSA) to study the influence of prize money differentials on both driver per-
formance and safety. They find that the prize spread has indeed the expected incen-
tive effects on individual performance and that these effects peak at rather high 
spreads and then level off. Perhaps most important is yet another finding: Driver 
safety is adversely affected by increasing the prize spread, suggesting that tourna-
ments may produce “undesirable” behavior as well.
20
 
•  Prinz (1999) uses data from 44 different long-distance triathlons (“Ironman”) held in 
nine different places (1989-1999) all over the world. Ironman contests are interesting 
insofar as purses are rather low compared to sports like golf and tennis (the average 
purse a top ten finisher takes home is slightly more than 3.000 US$) while the train-
ing requirements by far exceed those in most other sports
21. Nevertheless, the author 
finds that both a higher purse and a greater spread result in faster finish times. More-
over, the smaller the difference between the prize money attached to a specific rank 
and the preceding rank, the slower the finish times. These findings are robust on fur-
ther controls, such as athlete quality (measured by the personal records of the athle-
tes), 
                                                 
20 Von Allmen (2001) shows that the reward structure in NASCAR is efficient, because of the linearity 
of the reward structure of individual races that is accompanied by highly nonlinear end-of-season re-
wards. The analysis shows that the need to maintain sponsorship exposure, combined with drivers’ 
willingness to take risks (and the possible catastrophic result of negative outcomes of such behavior), 
creates a competitive environment where winner-take-all would be inefficient (empirical evidence in 
support of these assumptions is provided by Depken and Wilson (2004)). In a companion paper, von 
Allmen (2002) shows that neither in NASCAR nor in CART (Championship Auto Racing Team) do 
drivers respond to the possibility of increases in marginal winnings or losses. Moreover, Terkun and 
Maloney (2000) find evidence supportive of tournament theory by using data from the motorcycle in-
dustry.  
21 On average, professional iron(wo)men train eight hours a day approaching 35k of swimming, 1.000k 
of biking and 100k of running per week. 
  16 
Summarizing, it appears that the amount of prize money offered induces considerable 
selection effects while the distribution of the purse induces the participants to put forth 
effort in an attempt to maximize their individual revenues. 
 
4.2.  Incentives, Risk-Taking and Strategic Behavior 
 
Identifying the most able athletes by rank-order tournaments is problematic if the con-
testants are able to choose strategies of different risk. First, the tournaments’ outcomes 
are then mainly determined by luck or random components and, therefore, do not pro-
vide much information about the athletes abilities. Second, athletes preferring high risk 
strategies often choose low effort levels. Since risk-taking behavior is likely to bias the 
results of a contest, it is of interest, first, to explore to what extent athletes make use of 




Grund and Gürtler (2005) study the risk-taking behavior of head coaches in the German 
“Bundesliga” in 2003/04 by looking at the positions of players who are substituted dur-
ing a match
23. In principle, a coach can undertake a risk neutral substitution (the player 
taken off the field and the player sent on the field have the same tactical position), a 
risk-taking substitution (a defender is replaced by either a midfielder or a forward or a 
midfielder by a forward) or a risk-reducing substitution (a midfielder or a forward is 
replaced by a defender or a forward by a midfielder). A risk-taking substitution in-
                                                 
22  Abrevaya (2002) studies individual performance in ladder tournaments, using data from professional 
bowling competitions. He finds that “underdogs” win more often than expected and explains this not 
by differing individual responses to (financial) incentives, but by “hot-hand” and “regression-to-the-
mean” theories. Moreover, when analyzing data from sumo wrestling, Duggan and Levitt (2002) are 
less interested in testing predictions derived from tournament theory than finding evidence for corrup-
tion. Nevertheless, they can show that wrestlers’ effort apparently increases when the marginal returns 
to winning increase. Willoughby and Kostuk (2005) examine the choice between taking a single point 
or blanking an end in the latter stages of a curling game. It turns out that blanking an end is the better 
alternative, but it is usually only chosen by Americans, but not by Europeans. Laband (1990) finds 
that tournament wins are concentrated among a small number of top players in tennis, but not in golf. 
He does not explain this by referring to differences in risk-taking, but by emphasizing the importance 
of the match-play structure of competition and the practice of seeding the top players against weaker 
players in the early rounds of a tennis tournament. 
23  A soccer team consists of 11 players. The players are specialized in one of the following positions: 
They are either goalkeeper, defender, midfielder or forward (only one goalkeeper is allowed in the 
team). Up to three substitutions per team are allowed during a match. 
  17creases the probability to score a goal, but also increases to possibility that a goal is 
scored against the team. As expected, the probability of risk-taking (risk-reducing) sub-
stitutions decreases (increases) with the difference in goals: Coaches replace defensive 
players by offensive one when their team is behind and substitute offensive players by 
defensive ones when their team is ahead. However, risk-taking behavior does not pay: 
The increase in the probability of scoring an additional goal is more than offset by the 
increasing probability of conceding a (further) goal. 
 
Studying videotapes of all middle and long-distance races at the 1992 Olympic Games 
in Barcelona, Boyd and Boyd (1995) show that in the men’s races (but not in the wom-
en’s) the “underdogs” moved first and the “favorites” tended to wait: While the pre-race 
favorites (measured by prior performance) usually start out conservatively and then 
move up past other runners as the race develops, the underdogs tend to start quickly but 
see their performance and relative race position deteriorate as the event transpires. The 
fact that the men’s races are considerably more strategic than the women’s is apparently 
due to the fact that the talent pool is more concentrated for men than for women (see 
also Deaner 2006)
24. Not surprisingly, risky strategies pay off for the underdog only on 
the middle distances. The longer the race is, the less likely the underdog is to win. 
 
A further study that deserves being mentioned in this context is the one by Bronars and 
Oettinger (2001). They test for effects of golf tournaments on risk-taking by analyzing 
whether players who appear to have an incentive to take (avoid) risks over the last holes 
of the final round are more (less likely to shoot scores that deviate considerably from 
par (i.e. the “normal” result for a professional). Surprisingly, their results are in accor-
dance with tournament theory, but are not statistically significant. 
 
Assuming for a moment that the card game “Poker” is indeed a sport, a study by Lee 
(2004) is quite interesting. Poker tournaments are particularly suitable to study risk-tak-
ing behavior, because risk-taking is the essential component of an individual’s strategy 
                                                 
24  Munasinghe, O’Flaherty and Danninger (2001) compare the development of local (high school) and 
world records in track and field to separate the overlapping effects of technical change (better equip-
ment, better training methods etc.) and globalization (increased competition) and find that the former 
is more is more important than the latter to explain the observed pattern. Moreover, Scully (2000) 
documents the decreasing returns to training. 
  18while the problem of effort choice is trivial. Moreover, poker tournaments provide a 
unique opportunity to evaluate risk-taking behavior under well-defined rules in  the face 
of high monetary incentives – something that cannot be achieved in a laboratory ex-
periment. Apart from that, players are homogenous in quality and are unlikely to make 
systematic mistakes in statistical calculations. Using data from 27 tournaments of the 
“World Poker Tour” in 2002/03-2003/04 it is found that risk-taking behavior is com-
pletely in line with the predictions of tournament theory: Players choose the degree of 
risk depending on monetary incentives, i.e. if a player is trailed by the nearest leader by 
a larger gap or if he leads the nearest follower by a larger gap, be usually bets more, 
suggesting that risk taking is clearly dependent on chip spread. Moreover, a larger ex-
pected gain or a smaller expected loss strengthens the incentives for risk-taking. 
 
4.3.       Do Male and Female Athletes Respond Differently to Incentives? 
 
Recently, a number of primarily experimental studies have tried to answer the question 
whether women respond differently to competitive pressure than men. While Gneezy, 
Niederle and Rustichini (2003) reveal the existence of a significant gender gap in a 
tournament setting (men’s performance increases significantly with the competitiveness 
of the environment but women’s performance does not)
25, Paarsch and Shearer (2007) 
reach the opposite conclusion. Using data from a tree-planting company in British Co-
lumbia they find that there is no difference in the reaction to incentives between male 




A closer look at the findings presented by Frick (1998) and Frick and Klaeren (1997) 
suggests that women respond much more than men to an increase of the prize purse as 
well as to changes in the prize spread. However, women seem not to respond to bonus 
payments (i.e. additional rewards for absolute performance). While at odds with the 
                                                 
25   In a laboratory setting, Niederle and Versterlung (2005) find that twice as many men as women 
choose a tournament compensation system over a fixed salary. However, there seem to be no gender 
differences under either remuneration system. 
26  This is consistent with a finding reported in Vandegrift and Brown (2005), that although women are 
more risk-.averse than men, the former are no less likely to adopt a high-variance strategy in a tour-
nament competition. 
  19traditional tournament model at first sight, there is a rather simple explanation for the 
different behaviors of men and women: With regard to their performances, the male 
marathon elite is much more homogeneous than the female elite. In 1996 for example, 
the difference between the fastest runner of the year and no. 50 on that list was 2:39 
minutes in the men’s field and 4:37 in the women’s. Given the same number of races for 
men and women, this implies that members of the female elite can (and indeed do) 
avoid competing against each other. Such a behavior is not possible for men, who (due 
to the homogeneity of the competition) will always face other runners of similar 
strength. Given these specific conditions it is hardly surprising that bonus payments do 
not induce higher effort levels in the women’s races.  
 
Due to the heterogeneity among the female elite, it was (and still is) quite possible for a 
woman to win a marathon with a sub-optimal performance, while this is entirely impos-
sible for a male runner. While this may sound strange to most people (sports fans as 
well as economists), the authors present ample evidence for this proposition: The female 
winners of the races in their sample were on average more than six minutes slower than 
the then actual world record (2:21:06) while the male winners were only about three 
minutes above the record (then 2:06:50). Moreover, in 1995 the fastest 50 times in the 
women’s races have been clocked by 42 different runners while 48 different men were 
needed to deliver the 50 best performances of that year. Apparently, it is rational for 
female elite runners to participate in more than two marathons per year and to try to 
finish “within the money” several times instead of running only two marathons per year 
(as most of the male athletes do) with the goal of winning prize money as well as a bo-
nus for an especially noticeable performance
27. 
 
Paserman (2007) studies the response of male and female tennis players to competitive 
pressure in nine different Grand Slam tournaments played between 2005 and 2007, i.e. 
in a setting with large monetary rewards. Her major finding is that men’s performance 
                                                 
27  In 2001, exactly 88 men finished a marathon in less than 2:11 while an equal number of women were 
faster than 2:30. While a time of 2:10:59 is only 4,2% slower than the existing world record of 
2:05:44, a 2:29:59 is already 8,1% slower than the 2001 world record of 2:18:47 (in 2003 it has been 
improved to 2:15:45). Also in 2001, only 19 female, but 135 male athletes finished a marathon within 
105% of the then current world record (see Deaner 2006 for an explanation why more men than wom-
en are running fast). 
  20(measured by either unforced errors or winners) does not vary much depending on the 
performance of the point while women’s performance deteriorates significantly as 
points become more important. The results of a number of estimations suggest that 
women play a more conservative and less aggressive strategy as points become more 
important, i.e. men hit faster first serves as importance rises while women hit signifi-
cantly lower first serves as the stakes become higher  
 
5. Summary and Implications for Further Research 
 
Summarizing the available evidence it appears that virtually all of the predictions of 
tournament theory are unequivocally supported by data from a variety of contests (foot-
races, golf and tennis tournaments, horse races, auto racing, triathlons and bowling 
competitions). 
 
Although monetary rewards do have the incentive and selection effects predicted by 
tournament theory, several qualifications seem to be warranted: First, in situations, 
where the abilities of the contestants differ, bonuses for absolute performance may be an 
adequate instrument to induce the more able persons not to reduce their effort levels. 
However, if these persons have outside options in the sense of being able to enter addi-
tional competitions, it is very likely that they will choose a less risky strategy by com-
peting more often at a level well below their abilities. 
 
Second, if cooperation requirements are crucial for the performance of the contestants, 
increasing the number of prizes awarded may be a helpful strategy, because this will 
reduce the opportunity costs of contestants who fear that otherwise they will end up 
without any compensation. Thus, if it is in the interest of the organizer “to keep the field 
together”, it may be wise to pay prizes to a larger number of the contestants. 
 
Moreover, two important puzzles remain to be solved: First, a convincing separation of 
the incentive and the selection effects of tournaments has not been performed yet, but 
should be possible given the data that is available from, for example, track and field: 
Since the IAAF’s “Grand Prix Circuit” consists of three different series of events with 
  21prize money levels that differ between the series, but are identical across the meetings in 
any one of the series (but not over time), empirical tests of the relative contribution of 
incentive and (self) selection effects to explain the observed patterns of performance are 
now possible in a quasi-experimental setting. Second, the introduction of prize money 
in 1993 (in the form of a car) and the subsequent changes in the level as well as the dis-
tribution of the prize money at the IAAF’s World Championships in Athletics provides 
yet another quasi-experimental setting to study the impact of financial rewards on the 
behavior of utility-maximizing agents.  
 
In his survey of tournament theory, Rosen (1988: 89) argues that “there is a large gap in 
formulating … testable empirical hypotheses. Much could be gained by studying the 
details of real organizations …, where many of the forces suggested by theory can be 
observed and new observations that will enrich the theory can be discovered”. Future 
research should take up this challenge and add further evidence to the already existing 
body of literature. Given the availability of excellent data and the interests of many 
economists in professional sports in general and in track and field in particular this goal 





Abrevaya, J. (2002): Ladder Tournaments and Underdogs: Lessons from Professional 
Bowling. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 47, 87-101 
Alchian, A.A. (1988): Promotions, Elections and Other Contests: Comment. Journal of 
Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 144, 91-93 
Becker, B.E. and M.A. Huselid (1992): The Incentive Effects of Tournament Compen-
sation Systems. Administrative Science Quarterly, 37, 336-350 
Bognanno, M.L. (1990): An Empirical Test of Tournament Theory, Ph.D., Cornell Uni-
versity 
Bognanno, M.L. (2001): Corporate Tournaments. Journal of Labor Economics, 19, 290-
315 
Boyd, D.W. and L.A. Boyd (1995): Strategic Behaviour in Contests: Evidence from the 
1992 Barcelona Olympic Games. Applied Economics, 27, 1037-1043 
Boyle, G., G. Guthrie and L. Gorton (2006): Whither Reputation? Dynamic Incnetives 
in the Sport of Kings, mimeo, Victoria University of Wellington, Wellington, NZ 
Bronars, S.G. and G.S. Oettinger (2001): Effort, Risk-Taking and Participation in Tour-
naments: Evidence from Professional Golf, mimeo, Department of Economics, Uni-
versity of Texas 
Clark, D.J. and C. Riis (1996): Rank-Order Tournaments and Selection, Memorandum 
No. 27, Department of Economics, University of Oslo 
  22Coate, D. and D. Robbins (2001): The Tournament Careers of Top-Ranked Men and 
Women Tennis Professionals: Are the Gentlemen More Committed than the Ladies? 
Journal of Labor Research, 22, 185-193 
Cooper, W.H., W.J. Graham and L.S. Dyke (1993): Tournament Players. Research in 
Personnel and Human Resources Management, 11, 83-132 
Cottle, R.L. (1990): Economics of the Professional Golfers’ Association Tour, in: Goff, 
B.L. and R.D. Tollison (eds.): Sportometrics, College Station: Texas A&M Univer-
sity, 277-291 
Deaner, R.O. (2006): More Males Run Relatively Fast in U.S. Road Races: Further 
Evidence of a Sex Difference in Competitiveness. Evolutionary Psychology, 4, 303-
314 
Depken, C.A. and D.P. Wilson (2004): The Efficiency of the Nascar Reward System: 
Initial Empirical Evidence. Journal of Sports Economics, 5, 371-386 
Duggan, M. and S. Levitt (2002): Winning Isn’t Everything: Corruption in Sumo Wres-
tling. American Economic Review, 92, 1594-1605 
Dye, R. (1984): The Trouble with Tournaments. Economic Inquiry, 22, 147-149 
Ehrenberg, R.G. and M.L. Bognanno (1990a): Do Tournaments Have Incentive Effects? 
Journal of Political Economy, 98, 1307-1324 
Ehrenberg, R.G. and M.L. Bognanno (1990b): The Incentive Effects of Tournaments 
Revisited: Evidence from the European PGA Tour. Industrial and Labor Relations 
Review, 43, 74-88 
Fernie, S. and D. Metcalf (1999): It’s Not What You Pay, It’s the Way that You Pay It, 
and That’s What Gets Results: Jockeys’ Pay and Performance. Labour, 13, 385-411 
Frick, B. (1998): Lohn und Leistung im professionellen Sport: Das Beispiel Stadt-
Marathon. Konjunkturpolitik, 44, 114-140 
Frick, B. and R. Klaeren (1997): Die Anreizwirkungen leistungsabhängiger Entgelte: 
Theoretische Überlegungen und empirische Befunde aus dem Bereich des 
professionellen Sports. Zeitschrift für Betriebswirtschaft, 67, 1117-1138 
Frick, B. and J. Prinz (2007): Pay and Performance in Professional Road Running: The 
Case of City Marathons. International Journal of Sports Finance, 2, 25-35 
Fullerton, R.L. and R.P. McAfee (1999): Auctioning Entry into Tournaments. Journal of 
Political Economy, 107, 573-605 
Garin, R. and P. von Allmen (2005): Gender Effects in Rank Order Tournaments: The 
Case of Professional Tennis, mimeo, Department of Economics, Moravian College, 
Bethlehem, PA 
Gneezy, U., M. Niederle and A. Rustichini (2003): Performance in Competitive Envi-
ronements: Gender Differences. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 118, 1049-1074 
Green, J.R. and N.L. Stokey (1983): A Comparison of Tournaments and Contracts. 
Journal of Political Economy, 91, 349-364 
Grund, C. and O. Gürtler (2005): An Empirical Study on Risk-Taking in Tournaments. 
Applied Economics Letters, 12, 457-461 
Gürtler, O. (2006): Are 18 Holes Enough for Tiger Woods? Bulletin of Economic Re-
search, 58, 267-284 
Hollobaugh, J. (2003): Equal Prize Money is Unrealistic. ESPN Olympic Sports, Sep-
tember 30, 2003 (http://espn.go.com/oly/columns/hollobaugh/1627368.html) 
Hood, M. (2006): The Purse is not Enough. Modeling Professional Golfers Entry Deci-
sion. Journal of Sports Economics, 7, 289-308 
Hvide, H.K. (2002): Tournament Rewards and Risk-Taking. Journal of Labor Econom-
  23ics, 20, 877-898 
Hvide, H.K. and E.G. Kristiansen (2003): Risk-Taking in Selection Contests. Games 
and Economic Behavior, 42, 172-179 
Kahn, L.M. (2000): The Sports Business as a Labor Market Laboratory. Journal of Eco-
nomic Perspectives, 14, 75-94 
Konrad, K.A. (2007): Strategy in Contests – An Introduction, mimeo, Social Science 
Research Center, Berlin 
Kräkel, M. (2005): Helping and Sabotaging in Tournaments. International Game Theory 
Review, 7, 211-228 
Kräkel, M. and D. Sliwka (2004): Risk-Taking in Asymmetric Tournaments. German 
Economic Review, 5, 103-116 
Laband, D.N. (1990): How the Structure of Competition Influences Performance in Pro-
fessional Sports: The Case of Tennis and Golf, in: Goff, B.L. and R.D. Tollison 
(eds.): Sportometrics, College Station: Texas A&M University, 133-150 
Lallemand, T., R. Plasman and F. Rycx (2005): Women and Competition in Elimination 
Tournaments: Evidence from Professional Tennis Data, IZA Discussion Paper No. 
1843, Bonn 
Layden, T. (1998): Prize Money vs. Appearance Fees. Sports Illustrated, July 22, 1998 
(http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/features/1998/weekly/9807027/it0727/c.html) 
Lazear, E.P. (1998): Personnel Economics for Managers. New York: John Wiley 
Lazear, E.P. and S. Rosen (1981): Rank Order Tournaments as Optimal Labor Con-
tracts. Journal of Political Economy, 89, 841-864 
Lee, Y. (2004): Prize and Risk-Taking Strategy in Tournaments: Evidence from Profes-
sional Poker Players, IZA Discussion Paper No. 1435, Bonn 
Lynch, J.G. (2005): The Effort Effects of Prizes in the Second Half of Tournaments. 
Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 57, 115-129 
Lynch, J. and J.S. Zax (1998): Prizes, Selection and Performance in Arabian Horse Rac-
ing, Working Paper No. 98-26, Department of Economics, University of Colorado at 
Boulder 
Lynch, J.G. and J.S. Zax (2000): The Rewards to Running: Prize Structure and Per-
formance in Professional Road Racing. Journal of Sports Economics, 1, 323-340 
McFall, T.A., C.R. Knoeber and W.N. Thurman (2006): Contests, Grand Prizes, and the 
Hot Hand, mimeo, Department of Economics, Wake Forest University 
Maloney, M.T. and R.E. McCormick (2000): The Response of Workers to Wages in 
Tournaments: Evidence from Foot Races. Journal of Sports Economics, 1, 99-123 
Maloney, M.T. and K. Terkun (2002): Road Warrior Booty: Prize Structures in Motor-
cycle Racing. Contributions to Economic Analysis and Policy, 1, 1-16 
Matthews, P.H., P.A. Sommers and F.J. Peschiera (2007): Incentives and Superstars on 
the LPGA Tour. Applied Economics, 39, 87-94 
McLaughlin, K.J. (1988): Aspects of Tournament Models: A Survey. Research in Labor 
Economics, 9, 225-256 
Moldovanu, B. and A. Sela (2001): The Optimal Allocation of Prizes in Contests. 
American Economic Review, 91, 542-558 
Moldovanu, B. and A. Sela (2006): Contest Architecture. Journal of Economic Theory, 
126, 70-97 
Munasinghe, L., B. O’Flaherty and S. Danninger (2001): Globalization and the Rate of 
Technological Progress: What Track and Field Records Show. Journal of Political 
Economy, 109, 1132-1149 
  24Nalebuff, B.J. and J.E. Stiglitz (1983): Prizes and Incentives: Towards a General Theory 
of Compensation and Competition.  Bell Journal of Economics, 14, 21-43 
Niederle, M. and L. Vesterlund (2005): Do Women Shy Away from Competition? Do 
Men Compete too Much? NBER Working Paper 11474, Cambridge, MA 
O’Keefe, M., W.K. Viscusi and R.J. Zeckhauser (1984): Economic Contests: Compara-
tive Reward Schemes. Journal of Labor Economics, 2, 27-56 
Orszag, J.M. (1994): A New Look at Incentive Effects and Golf Tournaments. Econom-
ics Letters, 46, 77-88 
Paarsch, H.J. and B.S. Shearer (2007): Do Women React Differently to Incentives? 
Evidence from Experimental Data and Payroll Records. European Economic Review, 
in print 
Paserman, M.D. (2007): Gender Differences in Performance in Competitive Environ-
ments: Evidence from Professional Tennis Players, IZA Discussion Paper No. 2834, 
Bonn 
Rhoads, T.A, (2007): Labor Supply on the PGA Tour: The Effect of Higher Expected 
Earnings and Stricter Exemption Status on Annual Entry Decisions. Journal of Sports 
Economics, 8, 83-98 
Rosen, S. (1986): Prizes and Incentives in Elimination Tournaments. American Eco-
nomic Review, 76, 701-715 
Rosen, S. (1988): Promotions, Elections and Other Contests. Journal of Institutional and 
Theoretical Economics, 144, 73-90 
Scully, G.W. (2000): Diminishing Returns and the Limit of Athletic Performance. Scot-
tish Journal of Political Economy, 47, 456-470 
Shmanske, S. (2004): Golfonomics, New Jersey: World Scientific Publishing 
Sunde, U. (2003): Potential, Prizes and Performance: Testing Tournament Theory with 
Professional Tennis Data, IZA Discussion Paper No. 947, Bonn 
Szymanski, S. (2003): The Economic Design of Sporting Contests. Journal of Economic 
Literature, XLI, 1137-1187 
Szymanski, S. and T.M. Valletti (2005): Incentive Effects of Second Prizes. European 
Journal of Political Economy, 21, 467-481 
Vandegrift, D. And P. Brown (2005): Gender Differences in the Use of High-Variance 
Strategies in Tournament Competition. Journal of Socio-Economics, 34, 834-849 
Von Allmen, P. (2001): Is the Reward System in Nascar Efficient? Journal of Sports 
Economics, 2, 62-79 
Von Allmen, P. (2002): A Comparison of the Reward Schemes in Nascar Winston Cup 
and Championship Auto Racing Team (CART) Auto Racing, mimeo, Economics and 
Business Department, Moravian College, Bethlehem, PA 
Willoughby, K.A. and K.J. Kostiuk (2005): An Analysis of a Strategic Decision in the 
Sport of Curling. Decision Analysis, 2, 58-63 
Zitzewitz, E. (2006): Nationalism in Winter Sports Judging and its Lessons for Organ-
izational Decision Making. Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 15, 67-
99 
 
  25